Sex Offenders: Recidivism & Collateral Consequences

March 2012 New Jersey:

Abstract:

This report examines the efficacy of sex offender registration and notification (SORN) through its influence on sex offender recidivism and collateral consequences. The first study examines the recidivism rates of two samples of sex offenders, those released prior to SORN and a sample released under SORN in New Jersey. It asks whether or not there are distinct risk profiles among sex offenders with regard to their recidivism trajectories, and if these profiles are similar or different for sex offenders pre- and post- SORN. Additional analyses also include an examination of the influence of demographics, substance abuse, mental health issues, treatment history, sex offense incident characteristics, and criminal history on recidivism trajectories. The second study looks at whether the recidivism trajectories post-prison release for post-SORN sex offenders are similar to or different from the recidivism trajectories post-prison release for post-SORN non-sex offenders who are released from prison via parole. It also specifically focuses on whether or not a series of collateral consequences are experienced similarly or differently among these post-SORN sex and post-SORN non-sex offender parolees.

Recidivism data for both studies in this report were obtained through the New Jersey State Police Computerized Criminal History System and the National Crime Information Center’s Interstate Identification Unit. The first study utilizes two samples of sex offenders, and each was provided by the New Jersey Department of Corrections (NJDOC). The pre-SORN group included a random sample of 250 male sex offenders released from prison by the NJDOC during the years 1990-1994, while the post-implementation group utilized the same sampling procedure and size and matched according to relevant demographics (age, race, and criminal history), with the exception that they were released during the years 1995-1999. For the second study, random samples of 247 post-SORN sex offenders and 250 post-SORN non-sex offenders released from prison in New Jersey via parole during 1995-1999 were drawn from the New Jersey Department of Corrections’ databases. The samples in both studies were followed for approximately eight years post-release for assessing recidivism. For both studies, official records of re-arrest for new offenses were employed as the measure of recidivism. Semi-parametric trajectory modeling was also used in both studies to estimate the recidivism trajectories of the pre- and post-SORN releasees, and the recidivism trajectories of the post-SORN sex offender and the non-sex offender releasees.

The first study finds that there are limited observable benefits of SORN regarding sex offender recidivism and general recidivism. With an overall low rate of sex offense recidivism, SORN status (e.g. whether an offender is or is not subject to SORN) failed to predict whether sex offenders would reoffend sexually. The results are consistent with previous research which has argued that sex offenders have relatively low rates of recidivism, typically significantly lower than non-sex offenders. SORN status was also not a significant predictor of which sex offenders would reoffend in general, including non-sexual recidivism. Although sex offenders and non-sex offenders share the experience of collateral consequences, results from the second study reveal that several collateral consequences including not living with friends, living in group facilities, and residential relocation appear to differentially impact sex offenders.

Policy makers and treatment providers should focus their efforts on those sex offenders identified as belonging to the high-risk trajectory with a particular interest in targeting the risk factors related to a high-risk trajectory. A targeted rather than universal application of SORN seems a viable alternative. Ultimately, the two studies in this report suggest that SORN is not likely to be an effective deterrent for sex offender recidivism and may produce an environment with specific collateral consequences that inhibit reintegration efforts post-prison release for sex offenders. ..Source.. by Richard Tewksbury, Ph.D. University of Louisville and Wesley G. Jennings, Ph.D. University of South Florida and Kristen Zgoba, Ph.D. New Jersey Department of Corrections

Recidivism Rates of Sexual Offenders up to 7 Years Later Does Treatment Matter?

2005 New Jersey:

Abstract
This article critically reviews the evidence on sex offender treatment and subsequently provides new estimates on short-term recidivism among sexual offenders released from prison in New Jersey.

The sample of male sex offenders is drawn from the Adult Diagnostic Treatment Center (ADTC), New Jersey’s only sex-offender-specific prison, and the general population of nine prisons within the state of New Jersey.

The ADTC sample receives treatment while incarcerated (n = 495), whereas no treatment is provided to the offenders in the general population sample (n = 223). Overall, 33% of the total sample (N = 718) commits a new offense. Of the total sample, 14% commits a new sexual offense and 24% commits a new nonsexual offense.

Significant differences exist between the ADTC and the general population samples with respect to nonsexual reoffending only. In the final analysis, treatment appears to matter in terms of a reduction in recidivism but not in conventionally expected ways. ..Source.. by Kristen M. Zgoba1 and Leonore M. J. Simon

Recidivism among four types of homicide offenders: An exploratory analysis of 336 homicide offenders in New Jersey

February 2007:

Abstract:
Despite a great deal of information on various types of offenders, there is only limited longitudinal research on the offending patterns, typologies, and recidivism of different types of homicide perpetrators. A random sample of 336 homicide offenders who were released between the years 1990 and 2000 from the New Jersey Department of Corrections were identified and followed for a minimum of 5 years. These offenders were tracked to determine if incarcerated homicide offenders who had no criminal histories prior to their homicide conviction recidivated less, and which specific variables correlated with recidivism. As a result of our analysis, we conceptualized a new four-fold typology of homicide offenders: 1) homicide that was precipitated by a general altercation or argument, 2) homicide during the commission of a felony, 3) domestic violence-related homicide, and 4) a homicide after an accident. In conclusion, none of the 336 homicide offenders committed another murder. However, we found the highest recidivism for new violent or drug crimes occurred in the felony homicide group (slightly over one-third), followed by the altercation precipitated homicide offenders (27%), which was in sharp contrast to the domestic violence homicide offenders with less than 10% recidivism due to a new violent or drug offense. ..Source.. by Albert R. Roberts, and Kristen M. Zgoba, and Shahid M. Shahidullah

Report on New Jersey’s GPS Monitoring of Sex Offenders

December 2007 New Jersey:

BACKGROUND
New Jersey’s “Sex Offender Monitoring Pilot Project Act” became law in August 2005, authorizing the New Jersey State Parole Board to subject up to 250 of the State’s most dangerous registered sex offenders to round-the-clock Global Positioning System (GPS) monitoring. The statute was retroactive in calling for GPS monitoring of all Tier III sex offenders who were not incarcerated or subject to civil commitment. The statute also allowed the State Parole Board Chairman to subject non-Tier III sex offenders to GPS monitoring, based on established statutory criteria and an assessment of their risk to the public.

The Act requires the Chairman of the State Parole Board to “submit a report evaluating the effectiveness of the pilot program to the Governor and the Legislature within 90 days upon completion of the pilot program. The report shall recommend whether the pilot program should be continued as a Statewide program.” Based on his review of the pilot program, State Parole Board Chairman Peter J. Barnes Jr. strongly supported extending GPS monitoring indefinitely, prior to the program’s expiration on August 11, 2007. GPS monitoring now continues under the “Sex Offender Monitoring Act,” which was enacted before the pilot program ended.

As explained in this report, only one of the GPS program’s total 225 sex offenders has been implicated in a new sex crime. This initial data suggests the State Parole Board’s GPS monitoring has contributed to a significantly lower recidivism rate than nationwide data indicates for high-risk sex offenders. Moreover, the GPS monitoring data was available to aid the investigation, by placing the sex offender at the time and place of the new crime.

The State Parole Board’s caseload of more than 4,300 sex offenders is one of the largest in America, mainly due to the advent of Supervision for Life sentencing guidelines for sex offenders. Under state law, the vast majority of sex crimes committed on or after October 31, 1994 will result in Supervision for Life. Prior to the introduction of this sentencing guideline, sex offenders made up less than 5 percent of the State Parole Board’s caseload. Today, they make up nearly a third of the caseload, with a net increase of about 45 new sex offenders each month. The Legislature has designated the State Parole Board as the body responsible for managing all sex offenders sentenced to lifetime supervision.

The goal of the State Parole Board’s supervision of sex offenders – independent of whether a particular sex offender is subject to GPS monitoring – is to prevent further victimization. The agency employs Evidence-Based Practices, drawn from the most effective supervision practices in New Jersey and elsewhere, for sex offenders and other offenders on the State Parole Board’s caseload.

Due to the compulsive and secretive behavior shown by sex offenders, however, these offenders require specific, intensive methods of supervision. Following guidelines recommended by the National Institute of Justice,1 the State Parole Board has adopted a “containment” approach to sex offender supervision. This approach includes intensive parole supervision and information sharing with partner law enforcement agencies; sex offender-specific treatment to help control sex offenders’ impulsivity; and will soon include polygraph examinations in certain cases, to obtain sexual history information and monitor offenders for behaviors that increase the risk of re-offense.

The GPS monitoring of New Jersey’s highest-risk sex offenders is a vital component of this model. It helps parole officers verify sex offender behavior; allows law enforcement agencies to share information and intercept new violations; encourages sex offenders to accept responsibility for their actions; and provides data that can serve as invaluable evidence for police and courts.

For the remainder of this research: by Peter J. Barnes Jr., Chairman, New Jersey State Parole Board

Sex Offender Registration and Notification: Limited Effects in New Jersey

April 2009:

Overview
In 1994, 7-year-old Megan Kanka was raped and murdered by Jesse Timmendequas, a sex offender who had been released after serving a maximum sentence. In response to this event and other sex crimes, community members successfully lobbied for the enactment of a law that requires sex offender registration and notification to the public that a sex offender is living and working in the community.

Since the mid-1990s, all 50 states and the District of Columbia have passed similar legislation, collectively referred to as “Megan’s Law.” Underlying these laws is the belief that notifying the public of the presence of sex offenders in their community allows citizens to take protective measures against sex offenders who live nearby.

Researchers for the first time have conducted an independent scientific assessment of the effects of the law in New Jersey.1 They analyzed data from before and after the law was enacted. The study’s primary goal was to examine the impact of the law on the state as a whole and each county within the state. (See “Limitations of the Study” for what researchers were unable to examine.)

Researchers studying the impact of registration and notification laws in other states have found similar results.2


Findings-- Sex offense rates in New Jersey have been on a consistent downward trend since 1985. During this period, rearrests for violent crime (whether sex crimes or not) also decreased. When the researchers examined the decline in each county and then examined the state as a whole, the resulting statistical analysis showed that the greatest rate of decline for sex offending occurred prior to 1994 and the least rate of decline occurred after 1995. Hence the data show that the greatest rate of decline in sex offending occurred prior to the passage
and implementation of Megan’s Law.

-- Megan’s Law did not reduce the number of rearrests for sex offenses, nor did it have any demonstrable effect on the time between when sex offenders were released from prison and the time they were rearrested for any new offense, such as a drug, theft or sex offense.

-- The majority of sexual offenders sentenced in New Jersey are convicted of incest and child molestation. In more than half the cases, the victim and offender know each other. Megan’s Law did not have an effect on this pattern: The bulk of offenses and reoffenses committed both before and after the law remained child molestation
and incest.

-- Megan’s Law had no demonstrable effect on the number of victims involved in sexual offenses, i.e., the data show no reduction in the numbers of victims.

-- Sexual offenders convicted after Megan’s Law was passed received shorter sentences than those convicted before the law; sentences before Megan’s Law were nearly twice as long as those afterwards. However, fewer sexual offenders have been paroled since the law was passed, due largely to changes in sentencing guidelines. As a result, offenders convicted before and after Megan’s Law serve approximately
the same amount of time.

-- Estimates of the cost show that New Jersey spent $555,565 to implement the law in 1995. In 2006, the estimated cost of implementing the law was approximately $3.9 million, based on data received from 15 of New Jersey’s 21 counties.


About the New Jersey Study

Phase One: Identify Trends
In phase one of the study, researchers used a pre-post research design to determine trends in the rates of sexually based offenses reported by law enforcement agencies in the 21 counties of New Jersey — 10 years before to 10 years after the implementation of Megan’s Law. To compare trends, data on violent, nonsexual crime and drug offenses were also collected and analyzed for the same period. All data came from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports. Prevalence rates for three types of offenses — sexually based offenses, nonsexually based offenses and drug offenses — were established using population estimates from the Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics guidelines and cross-referenced with the Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, a yearly publication of the federal government.

Phase Two: Compare “Before” and “After”
In phase two, researchers used a sample of 550 sex offenders arrested and released from New Jersey Department of Correction facilities before and after the implementation of Megan’s Law to examine the differences between the two groups. Pre-post comparisons looked for differences in general reoffense arrest rates, sexual reoffense rates, harm (violent offense rates, percentage of child victims) and community
tenure.

Phase Three: Estimate Costs
The final phase of the project aimed to assess costs associated with the implementation and current operation of community registration and notification activities in New Jersey. Cost assessment questionnaires were mailed to the Megan’s Law Units in the prosecutor’s offices for the 21 counties. Survey questions were classified under two general categories: start-up costs (equipment, Internet sex offender registry) and ongoing yearly implementation costs for the 2006 calendar year (staff salaries, Internet registry maintenance, equipment maintenance/supplies and office supplies). Fifteen of 21 counties completed the survey. Along with the cost assessment survey, prior New Jersey state budgets were reviewed for costs associated with the incarceration, rehabilitation and tracking of sex offenders.

For the remainder of this paper: by Kristen M. Zgoba, Ph.D., and Karen Bachar

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These researchers show the reason for the state's Megan's Law: "Underlying these laws is the belief that notifying the public of the presence of sex offenders in their community allows citizens to take protective measures against sex offenders who live nearby."

It was, to know where former sex offenders lived, and nothing more.

Their research proved that recidivism did not change before or after the law, but there was better monitoring of registrants. But what does monitoring mean? KNOWING WHERE THEY LIVE! Thats not monitoring that is but a political ruse for monitoring.

Megan’s Law: Assessing the Practical and Monetary Efficacy

December 2008:

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The research that follows concerns the various impacts of community notification and registration laws (Megan’s Law) in New Jersey. Although this report includes a variety of interesting findings and many ideas that will be explored upon post grant period, this research was embarked upon, in general, to investigate: 1) the effect of Megan’s Law on the overall rate of sexual offending over time; 2) its specific deterrence effect on re-offending, including the level of general and sexual offense recidivism, the nature of sexual re-offenses, and time to first re-arrest for sexual and non-sexual re-offenses (i.e., community tenure); and 3) the costs of implementation and annual expenditures of Megan’s Law. These three primary foci were investigated using three different methodologies and samples.

Phase One was a 21-year (10 years prior and 10 years after implementation, and the year of implementation) trend study of sex offenses in each of New Jersey¡¦s counties and of the state as a whole. In Phase Two, data on 550 sexual offenders released during the years 1990 to 2000 were collected, and outcomes of interest were analyzed. Finally, Phase Three collected implementation and ongoing costs of administering Megan¡¦s Law. The following points highlight the major findings of the three phases of the study.

„« New Jersey, as a whole, has experienced a consistent downward trend of sexual offense rates with a significant change in the trend in 1994.

„« In all but two counties, sexual offense rates were highest prior to 1994 and were lowest after 1995.

„« County trends exhibit substantial variation and do not reflect the statewide trend, suggesting that the statewide change point in 1994 is an artifact of aggregation.

„« In the offender release sample, there is a consistent downward trend in re-arrests, reconvictions and re-incarcerations over time similar to that observed in the trend study, except in 1995 when all measures spiked to a high for that period. This resulted in significant differences between cohorts (i.e., those released prior to and after Megan¡¦s Law was implemented).

„« Re-arrests for violent crime (whether sexual or not) also declined steadily over the same period, resulting in a significant difference between cohorts (i.e., those released prior to and after Megan¡¦s Law was implemented).

„« Megan¡¦s Law has no effect on community tenure (i.e., time to first re-arrest).

„« Megan¡¦s Law showed no demonstrable effect in reducing sexual re-offenses.

„« Megan¡¦s Law has no effect on the type of sexual re-offense or first time sexual offense (still largely child molestation/incest).

„« Megan¡¦s Law has no effect on reducing the number of victims involved in sexual offenses.

„« Sentences received prior to Megan¡¦s Law were nearly twice as long as those received after Megan¡¦s Law was passed, but time served was approximately the same.

„« Significantly fewer sexual offenders have been paroled after the implementation of Megan¡¦s Law than before (this is largely due to changes in sentencing).

„« Costs associated with the initial implementation as well as ongoing expenditures continue to grow over time. Start up costs totaled $555,565 and current costs (in 2007) totaled approximately 3.9 million dollars for the responding counties.

„« Given the lack of demonstrated effect of Megan¡¦s Law on sexual offenses, the growing costs may not be justifiable.


INTRODUCTION On July 29, 1994, Jesse Timmendequas, a sex offender who had been released after serving a maximum sentence in a New Jersey correctional facility, raped and murdered seven-year-old Megan Kanka in Hamilton, New Jersey.

The intense community reaction that followed extended well beyond the state. One expression of community outrage was the enactment of laws to notify the public of the presence of sex offenders living and working in their community. The premise was, and still is, that with this knowledge, citizens will take protective measures against these nearby sex offenders. As Beck, Clingermayer, Ramsey and Travis (2004) note, “Exactly what action is expected is not clear, but it is hoped that, armed with this critical information, citizens will work on their own or in concert with government to make their neighborhoods safer” (p. 142).

During the following decade, all 50 states and the District of Columbia enacted some version of such community registration and notification laws, collectively referred to as “Megan’s Laws” (Presser & Gunnison, 1999; Zevitz & Farkas, 2000). Although a few states, such as Washington, had enacted community notification laws prior to 1994, the federalization of community notification laws in 1996 created strong incentives for other states to follow suit (Presser & Gunnison, 1999).

The legislation known as Megan’s Law, includes both registration and notification. Sex offenders must register their addresses with local police jurisdictions within a specified time of release from prison. By way of the registration process, the public is then notified of the offender’s presence in the neighborhood. The goal of notification is to inform both the public and past victims so that they can protect themselves accordingly.

As with other states, registration and notification are separate steps in New Jersey, but are often referred to as one process. In New Jersey, offenders are placed into one of three tiers, representing a hierarchy of potential risk of an offender’s re-offense. A risk assessment instrument is used to predict the offender’s likelihood of re-offense, which ultimately determines placement into the tier. Tier one represents the lowest risk and requires only notification of law enforcement officials and the victims. Offenders are considered low risk and eligible for a tier one placement if they received a low risk assessment score and are on probation/ parole, receiving therapy, employed and free of alcohol and drugs. A tier two classification represents a moderate risk of a re-offense.

It requires notification of organizations, educational institutions, day care centers and summer camps. The factors for placement into a tier two category include a moderate to high risk assessment score, failure to comply with supervision, lack of employment, abuse of drugs or alcohol, denial of offenses, lack of remorse, history of loitering or stalking children and making threats (Brooks, 1996; Matson & Lieb, 1997; Witt & Barone, 2004). Tier three offenders are those who are predicted to present the greatest risk to re-offend. This category has generated the most legal resistance because it calls for the broadest level of notification. The entire community is notified through posters and pamphlets. The factors necessary for the placement into a tier three category are a high probability of re-offending evidenced by a particularly heinous instant offense or a high-risk assessment score, repetitive and compulsive behavior, sexual preference for children, failure or refusal of treatment, denial of the offense and lack of remorse (Brooks, 1996; Rudin, 1996; Witt & Barone, 2004).

For the remainder of this study: by Kristen Zgoba, Ph.D.; Philip Witt, Ph.D.; Melissa Dalessandro, M.S.W.; Bonita Veysey, Ph.D., Megan’s Law: Assessing the Practical and Monetary Efficacy (2008).